The Spanish Ministry of Interior has awarded a €12.3 million ($14.3 million) contract to Huawei to manage information obtained through judicial wiretaps according to media reports. Such cooperation between an EU-member state and a technology company central to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) normalisation of censorship and surveillance technology around the world must be opposed. ARTICLE 19 calls on the Spanish government to immediately conduct an independent human rights impact assessment of any such partnership with Huawei, and in the meantime to suspend all cooperation.
According to Spanish newspaper The Objective, Spain contracts the use of high-performance Huawei OceanStor 6800 V5 servers to store and classify information obtained by Spanish security agencies.
The deal follows from existing cooperation between the Spanish government and Huawei to provide technical support to SITEL, Spain’s system for telecommunications interception. Previously, The Objective reported that Spain’s National Police Corps and Civil Guard have partnered with Huawei technologies despite having never conducted the required security certification process with the National Intelligence Centre.
ARTICLE 19’s Head of Global China Programme Michael Caster, commented:
‘Spain should know better than to partner, at any stage of its tech stack, with techno-authoritarian China, well-documented for deploying sophisticated rights-abusing surveillance tools and technologies against its own population, including in the commission of crimes against humanity in Xinjiang. No rights-minded democratic state should be facilitating the international normalisation of Chinese surveillance technology.’
Infrastructure or any other technology cooperation with Huawei raises serious human rights concerns because of requirements in Chinese law to comply with repressive censorship and surveillance demands. For example, the Counter-Espionage Law requires all entities to cooperate with Chinese security organs to investigate espionage, which is defined so broadly as to include any engagement with foreign entities. The National Intelligence Law is so broad in its directives that the UK Cyber Security Centre in 2019 claimed it could effectively ‘compel anyone in China to do anything’ to support Chinese security organs. The Cybersecurity Law, which came into force in 2017 and is slated for amendment this year, includes numerous other requirements to censor, monitor, and record traffic data and provide access to security organs. All these laws apply equally to Chinese companies operating abroad.
Proven risks of transfer back to China
The risk of Huawei sending potentially sensitive information back to China is not unfounded. For example, in 2018 French newspaper Le Monde first reported that confidential network data from the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa had been mysteriously uploaded to servers in Shanghai every night at the same time between 2012 and 2017. Huawei was the primary supplier for the organisation’s computer system, although the company refuted surveillance claims.
Beyond legal requirements to comply with censorship and surveillance demands, China compels its national technology champions, like Huawei, to ‘unswervingly follow the Party’. This directive arises from the 2020 Party Central Committee Opinions on Strengthening the United Front Work of the Private Economy in the New Era, which directs Chinese companies to safeguard national interests and promote a positive image of the country. Such directives are part of the CCP’s capture of the private sector, compelling compliance with Information and Communication Technology laws noted above and support for broader information manipulation efforts.
Such concerns are compounded when taken together with rising transnational repression from China targeting overseas Chinese communities, including through the manipulation of Interpol Red Notice, exploitation of extradition treaties, or other law enforcement cooperation. ARTICLE 19’s recent report on China’s transnational repression of protest documents numerous cases across the EU, while others including Spain-based Safeguard Defenders have highlighted cases in Spain, such as China’s overseas police stations in Madrid.
Spain’s favourable disposition towards Huawei at odds with the EU
Despite obvious human rights risks, Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has been notably favourable to Huawei, defending the company in public, and permitting Huawei to operate research centres in Madrid. He has been critical of EU efforts to prevent Huawei from Europe’s 5G infrastructure – a stark contrast to the European Union’s cybersecurity of 5G networks toolbox for risk mitigation measures, which explicitly calls for prohibition of ‘high-risk’ suppliers such as Huawei.
‘Beyond immediate censorship and surveillance fears, Spain risks normalising Huawei tools and technologies in ways that are detrimental to human rights and fundamental freedoms in the EU and around the world. The move by Spain to grow closer to Huawei, and by proxy the Chinese Communist Party, is anathema to the European Union’s Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles. Normalising Huawei surveillance technology detracts from the EU’s new international digital strategy, directly contrasting its stated effort to promote a rules-based global digital order based on shared values of democracy and rule of law,’ said Caster.
Spain should immediately halt this cooperation with Huawei and launch a fully independent human rights impact assessment into its broader partnerships, especially surrounding the handling of sensitive information. The European Union should expand its awareness raising and support for member states to better identify and respond to the distinct human rights concerns posed by China’s involvement at any point in the technology stack across the EU. China must be denied any potential back door access to impose censorship or surveillance, in any form, anywhere against citizens or members of the Chinese diaspora within the European Union.