ARTICLE 19 has documented a global and concerning pattern in which defamation laws are used to intimidate or silence women reporting sexual harassment and gender‑based abuse. These legal actions mirror the wider trend of violence and harassment faced by women journalists online and offline. In this broader context, ARTICLE 19 intervened before the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) in the case XY v. Georgia, which concerns defamation proceedings brought against a woman following her public allegations of sexual harassment. In our submission, we urge the European Court to consider international human rights standards and comparative jurisprudence that can guide the application of defamation principles in these types of cases, ensuring that defamation laws are not misused to suppress survivors’ voices or discourage reporting.
ARTICLE 19 research shows that globally, women who report sexual harassment, particularly where the alleged perpetrators hold positions of institutional or political power, face various types of backlash. Instead of serving as mechanisms of protection, legal systems are frequently mobilised against those who speak out. In particular, defamation laws have increasingly been used as a tool to discredit complainants, impose financial and psychological burdens, and deter further disclosures. This pattern is not confined to any one country or legal system. When allegations of harassment become public, the response often shifts from scrutiny of the abuse to scrutiny of the woman’s credibility.
In our work, we have also seen how defamation proceedings against survivors reporting violence and harassment contribute to a broader environment of intimidation affecting women journalists, other women active in public life, and women seeking justice. The threat of costly defamation suits, reputational attacks, and professional consequences creates a chilling effect. Legal retaliation through defamation suits thus operates as a form of structural violence. It may be procedurally lawful, yet it functions to silence, punish, and isolate those who expose wrongdoing.
The case XY v. Georgia, currently pending at the European Court of Human Rights, provides a concrete example of this broader phenomenon.
A public service employee reported sexual harassment by her agency’s head and the Public Defender’s Office confirmed the harassment. Despite this, her former superior initiated defamation proceedings against her over two televised interviews, claiming they were factually untrue and damaged his reputation. The Court is now considering whether these defamation proceedings violated the victim’s right to freedom of expression.
In ARTICLE 19’s third-party intervention, we highlight that freedom of expression is essential for women to report sexual harassment and gender-based violence. It serves as a foundation for their rights to equality, dignity, and non-discrimination. We show that international human rights standards, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the UN Human Rights Committee’s guidance, ILO Convention No. 190, and the European Court’s jurisprudence, require States to prevent and address gender-based violence, ensure safe and effective reporting mechanisms, protect victims from retaliation, and investigate abuses diligently. Defamation lawsuits should not be weaponised to punish or intimidate survivors who speak out.
Comparative case law from multiple jurisdictions confirms that allegations of sexual harassment and assault, especially in workplace settings, are matters of strong public interest. Our research shows that courts generally apply a reasonable ‘substantial truth’ standard in defamation cases involving harassment, rather than higher criminal law evidentiary standards, recognising the structural barriers that survivors face and the risk of chilling other disclosures.
ARTICLE 19 therefore calls on the Court to adopt a nuanced and victim-sensitive approach to defamation cases concerning sexual harassment and gender-based abuse. Such approach should consist of considering, at minimum, four key factors:
- First, whether the impugned statements concern matters of public interest, including sexual harassment and gender-based abuse, in context of workplace safety and gender equality;
- Second, whether the speaker acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds, at the time of publication, to believe the allegations were true, even if they cannot be proved to a criminal standard;
- Third, whether the interference with freedom of expression is necessary and appropriate to protect reputation in light of the gravity of the underlying allegations and the structural barriers to reporting; and
- Fourth, whether the nature and severity of any sanctions for reporting wrongdoing are strictly proportionate and avoid creating a chilling effect on other victims who may wish to report similar abuses.
Within the broader context of violence against women journalists documented by ARTICLE 19, this case demonstrates that silencing women through litigation is not a separate issue from physical or online attacks. Judicial harassment forms part of the structural continuum of violence on the basis of gender, and ensuring that courts and legislatures recognise this is essential to upholding women’s freedom of expression and also to dismantling systemic barriers to equality and safety in the media environment.
Importantly, while this is a European Court case, our proposed victim-sensitive test should have universal application beyond the Council of Europe. We believe this approach would help counter the global misuse of defamation laws against women reporting harassment and other forms of gender-based abuse, and should be considered by courts elsewhere in similar cases.