The European Centre for Democratic Resilience (ECDR) was proposed as a flagship initiative of the European Democracy Shield – a voluntary cooperation hub where Member States come together to exchange knowledge, coordinate action, and respond more effectively to mounting threats to democracy. But what is the role of independent media in this setting? And what should the Centre prioritise to become genuinely effective, rather than a box-ticking exercise? These were the questions at the heart of our expert roundtable at the European Parliament.
On 23 June 2026, ARTICLE 19 Europe and Free Press Unlimited, as part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) project, organised a roundtable to gather views and develop recommendations on the mandate and governance of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience. The discussion brought together representatives of EU Member States’ Permanent Representations, the European Commission, journalists, and civil society organisations. The roundtable was hosted by MEP Kim Van Sparrentak and supported by the European Partnership for Democracy.
The roundtable had three main objectives:
- To provide recommendations on how to meaningfully embed a whole-of-society approach in the design of the Centre, including the active participation of media organisations and journalists.
- To highlight the key role of independent media in strengthening democratic resilience, particularly in collaboration with other stakeholders to respond to ‘disinformation’ and ‘foreign information manipulation and interference’ (FIMI).
- To gather perspectives on existing initiatives at national and international level, including national centres to protect democratic resilience. These will lay the ground for recommendations on how the ECDR and project proposals by Member States can protect media freedom and freedom of expression in support of democratic resilience.
The discussion was opened by expert and journalist interventions, which provided an overview of the Centre’s current status and objectives, as well as national experiences with countering FIMI and strengthening democratic resilience. Participants drew on examples from recent electoral processes in Moldova and Hungary to illustrate both challenges and successful approaches and to underline the close interrelation between internal and external threats to democratic resilience.
Design of the ECDR
Participants noted that the voluntary, project-based model of the ECDR ensures political support from all the Member States as well as flexibility to adapt the Centre’s response to future emerging threats to democratic resilience. The model encourages Member States to bring their best practices from the national level to the EU level, while also allowing for the projects under the ECDR to be tailored to their specific needs. At the same time, if not properly implemented, this model might not address the need for strengthened coordination and less fragmentation, some of the core objectives that the ECDR seeks to achieve. A positive effect of the ECDR already observed is that many Member States are in the process of setting up national centres for democratic resilience.
A strong consensus emerged that the Stakeholder Platform, a hub for independent actors’ engagement in the work of the ECDR, should become operational as soon as possible and that civil society and media should be included in its development and composition. Furthermore, participants stressed that the European Commission should establish transparent criteria for selecting participating organisations; these should include the involvement of organisations that have both meaningful on-the-ground experience, operating closely with relevant stakeholders, and capacity for inclusive stakeholder outreach. Furthermore, a key takeaway of the roundtable is that independent journalists and media must be recognised as core stakeholders within the Platform, reflecting their essential role in safeguarding democratic resilience. It was also emphasised that the exchange and engagement between the Member States, EU institutions, and external stakeholders should be meaningful and regular. Finally, for the ECDR to tackle FIMI and disinformation effectively, it was argued that measures vis-a-vis Big Tech companies as well as adequate and predictable funding for independent media are required.
Mandate of the ECDR
The ECDR will be progressively rolled out over the next few years, with the aim of gradually covering various elements of democratic resilience. It was underlined that the ECDR should not only have a reactive nature, but also preventative and assertive, analysing threat patterns as well as structural vulnerabilities and preparing for the information ecosystem of the future. While the Centre has a strong initial focus on addressing FIMI and disinformation— reflecting priorities identified by Member States — participants agreed that its mandate should evolve to address the broader range of (structural) challenges affecting democratic resilience, in line with all three pillars of the European Democracy Shield. More broadly, it was noted that the ECDR should align with relevant EU legislative frameworks such as the European Media Freedom Act and the Digital Services Act.
With regard to FIMI and disinformation tactics, it was noted that the ECDR could enable collective cross-border data gathering and analysis, allowing for early warning, prebunking, and awareness-raising among citizens. Independent and investigative journalists play a critical role in exposing and prebunking such campaigns, but also face enhanced security risks in doing so.
The following key recommendations emerged from the discussion:
- Establish the Stakeholders’ Platform without delay and ensure a true whole-of-society structure. Timely and meaningful participation of civil society and independent media in its design and operation is essential to the Centre’s success. The Platform should be designed as a permanent governance mechanism, rather than an ad hoc consultation forum, with clear opportunities for stakeholders to contribute to the Centre’s work and the implementation of the European Democracy Shield agenda.
- Ensure broad and inclusive stakeholder representation. The Platform should extend beyond Brussels-based and international organisations. Because FIMI is a global phenomenon with local impact (meaning that it crosses borders and spreads rapidly, becoming embedded in local discourses), the Centre must engage local civil society organisations, journalists, and media actors having meaningful on-the-ground experience, working on the front lines of countering disinformation and protecting human rights, including those operating outside traditional EU policy networks.
- Adopt a broader understanding of democratic resilience. Besides FIMI and disinformation, the Centre should also tackle other internal and external issues relevant to the European Democracy Shield. Strengthening monitoring capacities to detect and expose ‘information manipulation’ should go hand in hand with investment in prebunking, media and information literacy, and sustaining information integrity and independent media.
- Shift from reactive responses to preventive action. Democratic resilience requires moving beyond crisis response towards long-term prevention. Protecting civic space, addressing structural economic vulnerabilities, and improving citizens’ understanding of democratic institutions should form part of the Centre’s work. Several participants also highlighted participatory democracy methods, especially citizens’ assemblies, as an effective mechanism for strengthening democratic participation and incorporating citizens’ perspectives into policymaking.
- Build safeguards against political co-optation. The Centre should include institutional checks and balances and human rights safeguards to prevent its governance or activities from being captured or misused by governments or other actors seeking to undermine democratic principles while operating within democratic frameworks. In the same vein it should be able to withstand shifts in national politics in individual Member States.
- Move beyond the distinction between internal and external threats. Participants considered the traditional distinction between internal and external threats increasingly obsolete. The complexity of ‘information manipulation’, combined with the growing use of artificial intelligence to generate and amplify manipulative content, makes it increasingly difficult to identify the origin of threats. The Centre should therefore adopt a comprehensive approach that focuses on the impact of threats rather than their geographic source.
Provide sustainable and predictable funding. Participants emphasised that the Centre requires stable, long-term funding to fulfil its mandate effectively. This need was also reflected in the report adopted on the same day by the European Parliament’s Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield, which recognised the importance of establishing the Centre as a structural, autonomous EU entity with a clear mandate, adequate and predictable funding, and dedicated permanent staff. ARTICLE 19 Europe and Free Press Unlimited will organise follow-up discussions to explore these issues in greater depth with policymakers and stakeholders. The discussion will aim to further inform targeted recommendations on the Centre’s governance, mandate, and long-term development.
