WARNING:

This is not an exhaustive report on the status of individual cases. New information may emerge as cases develop, further reports are released, and official investigations progress.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andiarios</td>
<td>Colombian Association of Editors of Newspapers and Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asomedios</td>
<td>National Media Association (Colombia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBDDH</td>
<td>Brazilian Committee of Human Rights Defenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERREM</td>
<td>Committee for Risk Evaluation and Recommendation of Measures (Colombia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fecolper</td>
<td>Colombian Federation of Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLIP</td>
<td>Foundation for the Freedom of the Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDRDs</td>
<td>Human Rights Defenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICHR</td>
<td>Inter-American Committee on Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPPDHR</td>
<td>National Policy for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (Brazil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPU</td>
<td>National Protection Unit (Colombia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPDDH</td>
<td>Human Rights Defenders Protection Program (Brazil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROVITA</td>
<td>Protection Program for Threatened Victims and Witnesses (Brazil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDH</td>
<td>Human Rights Secretariat (Brazil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1

INTRODUCTION
Freedom of expression is under attack in Brazil. Those words reading like an impact statement, unfortunately, declare the reality on the ground for many people who work with communication in the country. While censorship in Brazil is not official State policy, we see that it is systematically used by different actors in a way that silences voices that seek to identify, criticize and expose abuses of power to the public.

These are the voices of the communicators: people whose regular work and activity involves communication and the exercising of freedom of expression. It is as a direct result of their activity whether by criticisms of those in power - be it political, economic or military - they suffer many different forms of violations to their struggle to speak and be heard. Attempts to impose silence often result in extreme violence. Violations are experienced as physical and verbal abuse, arbitrary arrest, destruction or illegal confiscation of equipment, abusive lawsuits, intimidation, death threats, attempted murders and even homicide.

The protection of freedom of expression is vital if we are to guarantee the proper functioning of a healthy civil society. To enhance and protect these basic freedoms we must demand that the State fulfills its obligation to prevent violence from becoming a logical conclusion to the exercising of the fundamental right to free expression in the country.

It is within this context that we have produced this study. Over the last five years, ARTICLE 19 has monitored serious violations of freedom of expression faced by communicators in Brazil. During this period we have registered 152 cases in which communicators have been the victims of homicide, attempted murders, death threats and kidnappings. These figures place Brazil among the ten most dangerous countries in the world for communicators to work.

In this report we present and analyze cases of serious violations that occurred during 2016 (see Chapter 2). Figures illustrate a persistent pattern of incidents by region, of motivation and of perpetrators found in previous years. The figures prove that violence against communicators is not trivial, nor is it random. Instead we see that violence is a systematic means of ensuring silence.

In recognition of the scale and gravity of the problem, international organizations have been looking at ways of tackling this violence over a number of years. Both the UN and OAS, have produced recommendations to guide the way we understand the issue, but also a series of standards that look at international protection of freedom of expression.(See Chapter 3.)

One basic principle affirmed by these standards is that the State has obligations it must fulfill in order to guarantee the means to effectively combat the violence. These include the obligation to prevent the violations from occurring; the obligation to protect the communicators working in situations of risk; and the obligation to effectively prosecute those who commit these violations. Without the obligations fully undertaken by the State, it is impossible for the State itself to confront the problem.

The way in which these obligations are - or are not - fulfilled by the State varies depending upon the country and region, as well as internal demands, needs and contexts. Latin America hosts some of the most dangerous countries in the world for communicators. Perhaps because of this, several mechanisms that seek fulfillment of the obligations of States have been developed in the region.

Although the context of the data varies from country to country, violence against communicators follows clear structural patterns, and we look at those mechanisms developed in Mexico and Colombia for instance, we do so in order to help us understand better the situation in Brazil and it can be confronted. (See Chapter 4.)

In Chapter 5 we look at the protection mechanism that exist in Brazil. This was developed specifically for the protection of human rights defenders (HRDs) in situations of risk, and differ from other Latin-American contexts. While protections can be relevant to both groups we suggest that it is essential to understand and recognize the profile of the victim and the context of the violation, in order for the mechanism to be effective. To that end, in the conclusion to the report we provide recommendations that will enable the State to better confront the violence we have documented.

Addressing violence against communicators is not a problem that is confined to a certain groups of professionals. The violence is a matter that affects everyone, because it directly affects the quality of the information that everyone has access to. Even more so, in many cases, the violence affects the possibility of individuals accessing information on certain issues.

Making a problem invisible is a tried and tested way to avoid resolving it. This report therefore seeks to make the problem more visible and includes not only recommendations to government but an invitation for everyone to join together in the fight to guarantee the right to freedom of expression and information in Brazil.
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF VIOLATIONS AGAINST COMMUNICATORS IN 2016
Throughout 2016, ARTICLE 19 consistently monitored violations of the freedom of expression in Brazil. In those cases in which the violations are considered to be serious (homicides, attempted murders and death threats), a more in-depth investigation into each case was undertaken, including interviews with the victims, work colleagues, the authorities responsible for the case and other contacts relevant to an understanding of the different facets of each case.

We also looked at the relationship between the cause of the violation and the subject of expression undertaken by the victim. Of the 69 serious cases investigated we were able to establish a clear causal link between the violation and the subject of expression in 31 cases. (See full list of cases at the end of this report).

This is the fifth annual report that ARTICLE 19 has produced on this issue in Brazil, and it is evident that besides the very high figures that continue to be repeated year after year, the same general trends remain.

From the data we can see 152 cases where communicators have been the victims of serious violations simply in the performance of their jobs. No less than 24 of these people were murdered and a further 30 survived direct attempts on their lives. In 2016, the number of cases was slightly higher than the average for the period, with four homicide cases, five attempted murders and 22 death threats.

The violations analyzed here affect various profiles of communicators; that is professional categories of people who provide communication as a regular activity, even though their role may not be viewed as a formal position within an organization. This distinction is important when we look at the problem from the perspective of ability people exercising freedom of expression as a human right. For instance, the profile of the victims of violations in 2016 demonstrate the importance of this issue. We know that 35% of the victims were journalists or reporters and 35% were bloggers. We also know that 19% who were radio broadcasters and 10% owners of communication platforms / organizations.

The high number of violations against bloggers remains the same as the previous year and understanding specific profile of bloggers as a category of communicator is important. Generally, bloggers do not have any institutional support and face greater barriers to making themselves heard collectively as a professional category. These barriers increase their vulnerability not only to more serious violations, but to other forms of pressure and intimidation, such as lawsuits or criminal prosecutions, which often make it impossible for them to continue their work.

The vulnerability of certain types of communicators is also reinforced when we analyze the group of victims associated with a communication platform or organization. In 52% of the cases, the victims worked for platforms or organizations considered to be alternative, small and non-profit platforms or outlets. In 42% of the cases the victims worked for commercial outlets, 3% for community organizations, and 3% in public entities.
In 2016, serious violations occurred in every region of the country, however, just as in the previous year, the Northeast region registered the highest number of cases. The disproportionate figure of 45% of total violations places the Northeast at the top of the most dangerous regions in the country, and reafirms the need to pay special attention to the context of freedom of expression - or attacks upon it - in the region. Next, in terms of the number of cases, are the Southeast (22%); the North (16%); the South (10%); and the Central-West, with 7% of the total number of cases in 2016.

Amongst the specific states, São Paulo was responsible for 16% of the cases followed by three northeastern states: Ceará and Maranhão, with 13% of the total number of cases each; and Bahia, with 10% of cases in the country.

In addition to this, another pattern from the previous year was also repeated: the size of the cities where the violations occur also appears to be a factor in the manifestation of the violations. Small cities, with less than 100,000 inhabitants, produced 64% of the cases, whilst medium-sized cities, with between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants, accounted for 26% of the cases. Large cities, with more than 500,000 inhabitants, were responsible for 10% of the cases.

It is clear from these statistics that understanding the location and environment of the violation requires us also to consider policies to confront them. For instance in small cities, the communicators are much more visible, since there are fewer outlets and professionals covering each issue. In cases in which one particular political group dominates, the proximity between the communicator who makes an accusation and the politician or public agent who is being accused of wrongdoing increases their vulnerability.

This scenario not only facilitates violations, but by inhibiting communicators from publishing out of fear of reprisal, self-censorship is an unwelcome by-product.

In 2016, just as in previous years, agents of the State are the main suspects in the crimes committed (notably 77% of the cases analyzed in this report concerning violations by agents of the State). Included in this category are politicians, police officers and other public officials. It is also important to stress that in 65% of the cases, the main motivation for the violation was the publication, by the victims, of accusations of crimes or wrongdoings against the suspects of committing the violations, whilst in the other 35% it was the voicing of criticism or opinions.

In general, these are cases where communicators have published accusations via their outlets against public authorities, alleging that they have committed irregularities in public office. There is a clear relationship between motivation behind the violation and the threat posed by the decision to communicate on certain issues.

The scenario is even more worrying when we analyze the number of cases resulting in a criminal investigation, let alone prosecutions. Considering that the majority of the cases occurred less than a year before the research was undertaken for this report, understandably a great many of the cases are still unresolved. However, in at least one third of the cases in which a report was filed, there is no news of any investigation having subsequently been performed. In other cases, even though the victims have stated that they were aware that an investigation had been initiated, the police authorities provide no transparent information on the progress of these investigations.

As such, it is not surprising that of those cases in which the victims were still alive after the violation, around 11% of these victims had not even approached the police authorities to register the crime. In these cases, either there is no confidence in the police authorities’ initiative to perform an investigation, especially as they would need to investigate individuals who are quite powerful in the region, or they are frightened that these very authorities are involved in the violation.

In summary, the State violates the right to freedom of expression twice over in such cases: first when their agents are the principal perpetrators of the crimes; and second when the State fails to investigate and prosecute those responsible. Worst of all the absence of an adequate or suitable response to these violations by the State increases the likelihood of the violation happening again, and for the violence to become more extreme.

In 94% of the cases analyzed here, the victims had suffered previous violations.
PATTERN OF THE VIOLATIONS

MOST DANGEROUS STATES FOR COMMUNICATORS:
SÃO PAULO (SP), MARANHÃO (MA), CEARÁ (CE) AND BAHIA (BA) TOGETHER ACCOUNT FOR 52% OF THE CASES

THE NORTHEAST IS ONCE AGAIN THE REGION WITH THE MOST CASES

64% OF THE CASES TOOK PLACE IN SMALL CITIES, WHERE THESE COMMUNICATORS ARE MORE VISIBLE AND THOSE COMMITTING THE CRIMES ARE CLOSER TO THE VICTIMS, A CONTEXT THAT GENERATES A PROCESS OF SELF-CENSORSHIP AMONGST THE COMMUNICATORS ON CERTAIN ISSUES

JOURNALISTS AND BLOGGERS WERE THE MOST AFFECTED INDIVIDUALS IN 2016!

66% OF THE CASES WERE MOTIVATED BY ACCUSATIONS, MADE BY THE VICTIMS AGAINST THE PERPETRATORS, OF CRIMES OR WRONGDOINGS.

IN 84% OF THE CASES ANALYZED HERE, THE VICTIMS HAD SUFFERED PREVIOUS VIOLATIONS WITHOUT ANY PROPER RESPONSE BEING PROVIDED BY THE STATE.

67% OF THE CASES WERE COMMITTED BY AGENTS OF THE STATE, INVESTIGATIONS HAD EITHER NOT MOVED FORWARD OR HAD NOT EVEN BEEN STARTED.

IN THE LINES OF INVESTIGATION CONSIDERED.

THE STATE ALLOWING THE CRIMES TO GO UNPUNISHED

THE STATE COMMITTING THE VIOLATIONS

AGENTS OF THE STATE ARE SUSPECTED OF COMMITTING 77% OF THE VIOLATIONS

THERE IS NO TRANSPARENCY IN THE PROGRESS OF THE INVESTIGATIONS

IN 39% OF THE CASES, THE INVESTIGATIONS HAD EITHER NOT MOVED FORWARD OR HAD NOT EVEN BEEN STARTED

JOURNALISTS AND BLOGGERS WERE THE MOST AFFECTED INDIVIDUALS IN 2016!

IMPUNITY!

IN 33% OF THE CASES ANALYZED HERE, THE VICTIMS HAD SUFFERED PREVIOUS VIOLATIONS WITHOUT ANY PROPER RESPONSE BEING PROVIDED BY THE STATE.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON PROTECTION AND SAFETY

PREVENT, PROTECT, PROSECUTE
Freedom of expression is a human right, protected by the most important international declarations, conventions and resolutions, as well as the 1988 Federal Constitution of Brazil itself. From this perspective, the document that has guided the discussion on human rights around the world for decades, the United Nations’ (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted in 1948, ensures freedom of expression in the following terms:

**Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.**

As well as everyone’s individual right, the freedom of expression also has a collective and instrumental dimension. Collective, since the free flow of ideas and information is not only the right and interest of citizens individually, but also of society as a whole, this being one of the bases of free and democratic societies. It also has an instrumental character, since the exercising of freedom of expression is fundamental to guaranteeing other human rights, such as the right to education, to health, to adequate housing, to a healthy environment, etc.

The role that communicators play in guaranteeing this right should therefore be understood, since they are the ones with most responsibility for the production, investigation and circulation of information and ideas in society. In addition to this essential role that communicators play in ensuring freedom of expression, it is important to recognize that their activity frequently places them at risk of suffering various crimes, from intimidation and aggression, murder, attempted murder and death threats.

As a result of this, States have a set of obligations in relation to international law to guarantee the safety of communicators. Drawing on different international documents that establish these obligations, there are two which deserve special mention and which are the principal reference points for this chapter. One of them is the report published in 2014 by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (ICHR), part of the Organization of American States (OAS), entitled “Violence Against Journalists and Media Workers: Inter-American Standards and National Practices on Prevention, Protection and Prosecution of Perpetrators”. The other is Resolution 33/2, adopted by the UN’s Human Rights Council (approved in September 2016).

Both of these documents stress the three basic obligations that States should assume to guarantee the safety of communicators, namely:

- The obligation to prevent the occurrence of crimes against communicators;
- The obligation to protect communicators in situations of risk;
- The obligation to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of these crimes.

As well as describing the obligations which States should assume before the international community, they also assist civil society in the supervision and monitoring of States’ commitment to guaranteeing freedom of expression and the safety of communicators. They also provide the basis for how public authorities should implement public policies in this area. The section below sets out the principal elements that make up each one of these obligations of the State.

**WHAT SHOULD THE STATE DO TO GUARANTEE THE SAFETY OF COMMUNICATORS?**

**PREVENT**

- Adopt a line of public discourse that contributes to the prevention of violence against journalists;
- Train security forces and public agents on the issue;
- Respect journalists’ right to keep the identity of their sources of information, notes and other personal files confidential;
- Develop precise statistics on violence against communicators.

**PROTECT**

- Condemn the violence and attacks on communicators;
- Establish warning and rapid response mechanisms in relation to violations;
- Protect communicators covering situations of great risk;
- Recognize the role of civil society organizations and the media in guaranteeing safety.

**PROSECUTE**

- Adopt a suitable institutional standard that allows for violence against communicators to be effectively investigated, judged and punished;
- Act with prudence and care in order to exhaust the lines of investigation related to the victim’s journalistic work;
- Perform investigations within a reasonable time period;
- Remove legal obstacles to the investigation and punishment of the most serious crimes against journalists;
- Allow the victims or their families to participate in order to clarify the facts and implement restitution.
PROTECTION MECHANISMS FOR COMMUNICATORS IN LATIN AMERICA
States have an obligation to adopt protective measures that benefit communicators who are at risk or in vulnerable situations. One of the ways of responding to this obligation is to creating formal protection mechanisms that are provided, organized and maintained by the State.

These mechanisms are considered especially necessary in countries that suffer from high levels of violations and where there are found to be a structural, systematic and serious patterns of violence against communicators. The protective measures adopted, either in isolation or within the context of mechanisms, should be suited to the individual circumstances of the person at risk, taking into account their gender, the need or willingness to continue performing the same professional activities, and their social and economic circumstances.

It is important to recognize that in many States where mechanisms have been created, the support provided to communicators is included in wider mechanisms that support protections for HRDs.

We will be presenting two of the oldest and most robust protection mechanisms to be found in Latin America – namely those that are in place in Colombia and in Mexico. Even with problems, both represent important reference points in the fight against the violence faced by communicators in one of the most dangerous regions for exercising freedom of expression anywhere in the world.

For the development of this study, we used analyses of the protection mechanisms in place in Colombia and in Mexico produced by civil society organizations that have monitored the mechanisms since their creation. The decision to focus on the vision of civil society seeks to show not only how the mechanisms are structured, but also how they function in practice.
PROTECTION MECHANISMS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AND JOURNALISTS IN MEXICO

HISTORY

The protection mechanism in Mexico arose from a context that saw a high rate of violence against journalists and HRDs in the country. The 'Espacio OSC' was created in 2008 by a civil society network of human rights organizations that decided to unite around a common agenda: to pressure the Mexican government into recognizing the situation of systematic violence that affects journalists and HRDs, and to develop public policies that confront this situation and provide protection for those in situations of risk.

Important advocacy actions were also carried out by international organizations that included an official visit to Mexico in 2011 by a representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at the time. These measures culminated in the recognition by the Mexican State of the importance of a protection mechanism. During the same year, the then President Felipe Calderón signed a Presidential Decree that allowed the development and implementation of a protection mechanism for journalists and defenders of human rights in the country.

HOW DOES THE MECHANISM WORK?

Mexico’s Protection Mechanism for Defenders of Human Rights and Journalists is based upon three approaches that together make up the concept of full protection. These are: preventing, protecting and combating impunity. The mechanism is designed not only to attend to cases through protection measures, but also to develop effective practice between public bodies overseeing the context in which HRDs and journalists work (and who are included in the mechanism). The goal is to eradicate the threats that contribute to the vulnerability of individuals and communities in the context of exercising freedom of expression.

In terms of prevention, the actions are focused on encouraging the defenders or journalists receiving assistance to develop permanent processes for the analysis of the vulnerable situation they find themselves in and a capability to implement protection measures to eliminate or mitigate the risks. For this to work properly it is essential that public policy is built on experience and information drawn from the victims themselves. As such the mechanism lays out the following measures:

- Distribution of pamphlets and communication materials;
- Provision of guides and manuals;
- Courses and workshops on individual or collective self-protection;
- Monitoring human rights observers or journalists

In matters of protection, the mechanism classifies those cases that need help as either ‘emergency’ or ‘standard’. The imminence of an attack is the big difference between these two types of case, and it is the government authorities responsible for receiving and initially attending to the cases that determine which classification they receive. Each of these classifications follows a different procedure, and follows two distinct protocols for providing assistance. The difference between the two assistance protocols is found mostly in the response time and steps that should be followed when considering the specific aspects of each situation. Journalists and HRDs are afforded the same protection measures, which are outlined below:
URGENT MEASURES

When recognizing that the risk that a defender or journalist runs is high and the occurrence of some sort of violation is imminent, the following measures can be implemented:

- Evacuation of the victim from the area of risk;
- Temporary movement of the victim to another location;
- Specialized security in the protection of properties.

PROTECTION MEASURES

When recognizing that the victim is in a situation of risk, but a violation is not imminent, the following measures can be implemented:

- Provision of communication devices (cellular phones, radios or telephones with satellite services);
- Provision of cameras, locks, lights or other security measures on a group’s property or at a victim’s residence;
- Provision of a bulletproof vest;
- Installation of metal detectors;
- Use of bulletproof cars.

Combating impunity is a fundamental goal of the mechanism, since it recognizes that the lack of investigations and attribution of responsibility to those who commit the crimes against journalists and HRDs is a principal factor in increasing the systemic nature of human rights violations. This is why, since it was formulated, the mechanism has incorporated efforts to resolve the cases as part of its strategy to protect journalists and HRDs. This area of the mechanism only works however if public policy is incorporated at all levels and areas of the State and involves effective contributions from other public bodies, especially those responsible for investigations.

PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE MONITORING AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE MECHANISM

From the very the start of the Mechanism, civil society in Mexico has participated very closely in its implementation, initially contributing to its creation, but also monitoring the policy and frequently developing recommendations for its improvement. It is important to highlight that here is a gap between the way the mechanism is designed and the way it actually works. Besides external monitoring civil society has a formally established role in the structure of the mechanism through an Advisory Board. The Board is a forum comprising civil society organizations (CSOs) and specialists in matters related to protection, who take part in meetings and decisions on cases together with other State actors responsible for the coordination of the mechanism.

The importance of the participation of civil society organizations in the mechanism is that they are in direct contact with journalists and HRDs and, as a result of this proximity, the experiences and knowledge that they contribute to public policy is fundamental. The organizations also make it possible for beneficiaries of the policy to participate in the processes involved in the analysis of their cases and in the determination, implementation and evaluation of the protection measures adopted.

CRITICISMS/CHALLENGES

Despite playing an active role in the creation and development of the national protection mechanism it is clear from their own evaluation that the CSOs require the State to take a number of steps to truly and effectively implement the protection policy throughout the country. Aiming to highlight the problems and emphasize which parts of the public policy need to be improved, the Espacio OSC network develops periodic analyses of the mechanism. The following points were highlighted in the most recent analysis developed by the network to which ARTICLE 19 has had access.

1. Effective involvement of public bodies

The entities that monitor the protection program have called attention to the lack of participation and commitment of the public bodies in the program. Several authorities were very late to the processes of the Governing Body, despite the fact that they are required by law to be actively involved in this area. Even today, the lack of certain authorities at the meetings and spaces of the mechanism shows that, in practice, a public policy needs political will to function properly.

Regarding to the access to justice, civil society organizations also question the effectiveness of public bodies to fight impunity in crimes against journalists. Even when the investigations start, most cases still don’t go to justice. In a mechanism designed to have the fight against impunity as a central issue, it is worrying that this line of action doesn’t actually work.
2. Lack of transparency and unavailable data

Evaluation of the effectiveness the Mexican mechanism is made more difficult by the lack of transparency of the authorities who coordinate it. However, the entities that are members of the Espacio OSC have individually and collectively documented the experiences of participation in the Mexican public policy on protection. A collective analysis was included in the last evaluation performed by this network, and focused on how the mechanism has worked based upon the documentation of 59 cases, covering requests and cases actually attended to by the program and monitored by civil society organizations.9

Another problem is that the risk assessment and the development of protection measures do not take properly in consideration the victim’s families. Thus, the lack of protection measures that includes an holistic perspective for the victim's lives are not completely effective.

3. Analysis of risk and suitable protection measures

In the case of the Mexican mechanism, CSOs have questions on the processes underpinning assessment of risk and development of the protection measures offered to journalists and HRDs. In many cases, such measures have been shown to be ineffective or not suited to the context or threat facing the victim, precisely because the necessary proximity to the CSOs does not exist. Nor does it exist in relation to the journalists and HRDs for the development of the risk analyses. For this aspect of the mechanism to work as it should it would be essential that for the mechanism to be transparent in relation to the methodology underpinning evaluation of risk, especially as there is a lack of knowledge in the CSOs about this process.

Another important question noted by the CSOs in Mexico is that the mechanism is capable of articulating other protection measures beyond removing the victim from their location. The organizations feel that moving a victim is an extreme measure, that should only be adopted when all other possibilities have been exhausted. The very process of can be extremely painful for the victim; furthermore, the distance from their place of work and/or community prevents the journalist or defender from continuing with their regular professional activities.
HISTORY

Colombia has been dealing with a context of armed conflict for a number of decades that affects many sectors of society, amongst which are journalists. As far back as the Colombian Government decided to adopt a series of measures to enable the development of mechanisms to protect against human rights violations in the country. From those efforts arose protection mechanisms for specific sectors where individuals found themselves in situations of risk as a result of their social status or position. In a scenario involving armed conflict and guerrillas, journalists became a political and military target and the rate of violence increased in the 1990s when the drug traffickers declared war on journalists. As such, in 1999, Colombia became the first country in Latin America to create a protection mechanism for communicators which, until 2003 operated independently.

In 2003, the State unified all the protection programs in a single mechanism and at present this mechanism, called the National Protection Unit (NPU) serves the needs of nine sectors of the public, including journalists.

The creation of a protection mechanism that was initially destined specifically for journalists served to position the problem politically and pressure the State to take active measures to combat it. Moreover, it was a measure that effectively reduced the number of mortal attacks on journalists resulting from their activities.

HOW DOES THE NATIONAL PROTECTION UNIT (NPU) FUNCTION IN COLOMBIA?

The majority of cases that are brought to the attention of the NPU come via the freedom of expression organizations that monitor the mechanism. However, journalists can seek assistance from other public entities working with threats to FoE. The police, for example, are obliged to report any cases they become aware of involving journalists to the NPU. This measure is interesting since it has the potential to transform the perspective of security agents on crimes against journalists, and influence the way investigations into these crimes are conducted.

After becoming aware of a case, a team from the NPU goes into the field to investigate the information and carry out a risk analysis on the victim. This is fundamental for a true understanding of the situation and the context in which the journalist is placed, but it can only be performed if the NPU has sufficient resources to undertake the research. Next, the group responsible for deciding what level of risk the journalist is in issues recommendations and sends the case to the Committee responsible for deciding which protection measures should be adopted by the NPU. The speed of this process depends upon the level of risk that the analysis of the case establishes, and specific procedures exist when the risk of an attack is imminent.

The NPU is responsible for implementing and monitoring the protection measures provided to beneficiaries. It is also required to conduct a new risk evaluation once a year or if new events relating to the case occur. It is also the responsibility of the NPU to assess the removal of beneficiaries from the mechanism: the decision is taken only on the basis of an evaluation that a risk no longer exists.

The measures available for protection under the mechanism are divided between hard and soft. The hard measures are physical and human resources, such as guards, drivers and bullet-proof vehicles. The soft measures consist of communication devices, bulletproof vests and transport expenses.
PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE COLOMBIAN PROTECTION PROGRAM

Civil society takes a formal part in the NPU, acting as observer and as representative of the interests of the journalists assisted. Each organization provides any information it can about the cases that come to the attention of the mechanism. There are four civil society organizations involved in the Committee for Risk Evaluation and Recommendation of Measures that, even though they do not hold voting powers, are highly active on the Committee: the Colombian Federation of Journalists (Fecolper); the Colombian Association of Editors of Newspapers and the Media (Andiarios); the National Media Association (Asomedios) and the Foundation for the Freedom of the Press (FLIPXX).

CRITICISMS/CHALLENGES

Civil society organizations recognize the enormous advance represented by the very existence of a mechanism focused on the protection of journalists in the country. In particular the structure and policy focus of the NPU has also, during the 15 years it has been in existence, worked to establish public policy on protection. However, the organizations stress that the involvement of different governmental bodies is not enough; what is needed is that the representatives of these bodies have the political will and commitment to perform their functions.

The assessment of Colombian civil society is that fewer and fewer State bodies are assuming responsibility for the protection policy or finding ways to resolve the challenges. One symptom of this is that the Colombian mechanism makes great use of physical protection measures such as guards and bulletproof vehicles, whilst less and less attention is paid to preventative issues that could resolve the situations of risk which the journalists are experiencing and which could result in a situation where they no longer need physical protection measures.

Another extremely important question in the context of the Colombian mechanism surrounds accusations of corruption involving the public servants responsible for the NPU. In 2014 these accusations resulted in the appointment of a new director for the Unit.

The overall failure to resolve violations against journalists in the country contributes to a general atmosphere of impunity, presenting one of the biggest challenges to Colombian civil society. In this context the inability of the public entities responsible for investigations under the NPU is a significant factor in the persistence of violence against freedom of expression in the country.
5

THE BRAZILIAN PROTECTION MECHANISM
Unlike the creation of protection mechanisms in Mexico and Colombia, Brazil has not developed mechanisms specifically dedicated to meeting the needs of communicators, despite the sustained impact of violations outlined in chapter two of this report.

Against the backdrop of serious violence against HRDs in Brazil, a program was created in 2005 specifically to focus on this group. At a later date, once the mechanism was operational, the Brazilian state announced that communicators would also be reviewed and eligible under the program. However, no formal recognition of this measure or more effective alteration in the structure or functioning of the program was made to accommodate communicators at risk.

The creation of the Defenders of Human Rights Protection Program (PPDDH) in Brazil was the fruit of enormous pressure exerted by civil society and social movements. Despite the United Nations’ General Assembly’s approval of Resolution 53/144 in 1998 that recognized the need to protect those who fight for the defense of human rights, it was not until 2003 that the Brazilian state began to take steps towards constructing a national public policy.

It is important to stress that the civil society organizations and social movements that participated in the initial process for the creation of the PPDDH in Brazil were mainly linked to the fight for land. The years prior to the creation of the PPDDH saw significant violence in many rural areas of Brazil, with 71 deaths being reported in the field in 2003, according to data from the Pastoral Land Commission. The missionary Dorothy Stang, was killed in February 2005 in the city of Anapu, in the State of Pará, and represents an emblematic case that showed the situation of violence and threats to HRDs in Brazil. In February 2005, the PPDDH was launched at an event held in Belém in the State of Pará, with the participation of civil society and social movements. The missionary Dorothy Stang was at the event which took place two weeks before her death.

When it was created, the PPDDH was designed to operate as a pilot project at the federal level and in three states: Pará, Espírito Santo and Pernambuco. On February 12, 2007, the Federal Government approved the National Policy for the Protection of Defenders of Human Rights (PPDH), and established a deadline for the drafting of the National Plan, which would not be implemented until November that year. The plan led to the publication of the manual of procedures for protection programs, which systematizes the strategic formulations, methodological procedures and the operational structure of the National Program.

During the first decade the mechanism was based upon the 2007 decree. There is a bill that aims at instituting the PPDDH as a public policy making its way through the National Congress since 2009, but it is currently held up and there is little expectation that it will resume its course.

In April 2016 during the turbulent scenario surrounding the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, the president signed a decree providing critical changes to the structure of the protection program, since:

a) The decree restricted the reach of the PPDDH to people in threatening situations, going against the OEA’s resolution 53/144 and the PPDDH procedures manual itself. The latter had been produced by the Human Rights Department (SDH) in partnership with civil society and other public organs and determined that protection of defenders should be provided for individuals or groups in situations of risk and vulnerability, not just those in threatening situations;

b) The decree also created a decision-making council within the PPDDH, but only mandated participation on the council by organs of the State, and excluded participation by civil society, which had, from the very beginning, been fighting for a joint role. Instead the new structure allowed for participation by only two members of the Human Rights Department and one member of the Ministry of Justice.
STRUCTURE OF THE BRAZILIAN PROTECTION PROGRAM AND SERVICE PROVISION

Because the PPDDH was created within the sphere of the Human Rights Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic, protection policies were always assumed to be the concern of the public body responsible. Even though management of the mechanism is federal and includes a Department for General Coordination of the National Program responsible for providing assistance to cases throughout the country, the structure of the mechanism was conceived to operate at state level, through partnerships between the Human Rights Secretariat and the individual States. Twelve years after the creation of the PPDDH, only nine of the 27 Brazilian states have taken the initiative to establish the mechanism for certain periods. Currently the PPDDH only exists in four states - Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, Ceará and Maranhão.

When seeking assistance from the PPDDH, human rights defenders can go to the state program or to the national coordination committee in those states where there is no local office. In addition, any public organ that is aware of a situation of violation or a threat to a defender can forward it to the protection mechanism. Civil society can also forward cases to the mechanism, and this frequently occurs as a result of the constant monitoring that many human rights organizations perform for the PPDDH.

HOW DOES THE PROTECTION PROGRAM WORK?

The Brazilian mechanism requires the beneficiaries to have a proven relationship with the defense and promotion of human rights. In addition there must be a causal link between a threatening situation or vulnerability and the defender’s activity.

It is also important to stress that, contrary to other protection programs at the federal level, such as the Protection Program for Threatened Victims and Witnesses (PROVITA), the job of the PPDDH is to recognize and respect the defender’s established presence in Brazil, as well as the continuation of its activities. In order for this to be achieved, the directive of the PPDDH is “to strengthen the federal pact, through joint and articulated activity at all levels of government in the protection of and operations to counter the causes that lead to a state of risk or vulnerability.”

MEASURES

The protective measures that are part of the Protection Program have three dimensions: to act directly for the security and well-being of the defenders assisted; to contribute to supporting the activities of the beneficiaries in the defense of human rights; and articulate measures that combat the structural situations of conflict within the contexts where these defenders work.

The Mechanism provides:

- Regular visits to the region in which the defender works;
- Dissemination of the defender’s activities and actions designed to promote their visibility;
- Public hearings focused on resolution of conflicts;
- Articulation with the organs involved in the resolution of threats;
- Articulation with the organs involved in the resolution of threats;
- Monitoring of investigations and accusations;
- Removal from the region in emergency or exceptional cases;
- Police protection in high risk cases.

First and foremost, the Protection Program was conceived to provide articulation with the organs and entities within the state system that can act to resolve conflicts, and to overcome the causes that lead to threats to defenders of human rights.
Civil society has been monitoring the mechanism since its conception, and this included contributing to its creation. In the first ten years of the mechanism's existence, five civil society organizations formally participated in the composition of the mechanism's National Coordination Committee, a shared space made up of public organs and civil society organizations that monitor and assess the performance of the Protection Program.

The most recent decree that established the Program's current institutional design did not include any participation by civil society. In practical terms, this Decree terminated the national coordination of the PPDDH, as mentioned in the previous item, was made up of five civil society organizations, all of which were members of the Committee.

However, fragile public policy has been gradually eroded by the Brazilian State, with 2015-16 notable for a serious deterioration in the Defenders of Human Rights Protection Program (PPDDH). According to information from the Human Rights Secretariat, the PPDDH currently provides services for 423 people in the federal sphere. Coincidentally, in 2016, a year in which significant roll-back of public policy took place, occurred the highest number of murders of HRDs since 2003 (the year preceding the creation of the public policy in Brazil). In 2016 a total of 68 registered deaths were recorded.

In the same period other public policies essential to guaranteeing protection for HRDs also saw much reduced impact, leaving the group even more vulnerable and exposed.

CRITICISM / CHALLENGES

Civil Society and social movements, articulated by the Brazilian Committee of Defenders of Human Rights (CBDDH), of which ARTICLE 19 is a member, is always closely monitoring the execution of the policy, and annually making recommendations for its improvement to the federal government. Moreover, national coordination of the PPDDH, as mentioned in the previous item, was made up of five civil society organizations, all of which were members of the Committee.

However, fragile public policy has been gradually eroded by the Brazilian State, with 2015-16 notable for a serious deterioration in the Defenders of Human Rights Protection Program (PPDDH). According to information from the Human Rights Secretariat, the PPDDH currently provides services for 423 people in the federal sphere. Coincidentally, in 2016, a year in which significant roll-back of public policy took place, occurred the highest number of murders of HRDs since 2003 (the year preceding the creation of the public policy in Brazil). In 2016 a total of 68 registered deaths were recorded.

In the same period other public policies essential to guaranteeing protection for HRDs also saw much reduced impact, leaving the group even more vulnerable and exposed.

PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Principal failings of the PPDDH in the view of civil society organizations

The Brazilian Committee of Defenders of Human Rights (CBDDH), which, in recent years, has highlighted a number of failings of the PPDDH, has noted the following as being worthy of special mention:

1. Difficulties involved in the processing and approval of PL 4575/2009 which regulates the PPDDH;
2. Failure to implement the National Plan for Protection of Human Rights Defenders;
3. The need to expand the structure and increase the budget of the PPDDH within the sphere of the Department of Human Rights, in order to guarantee protection of HRDs as a state policy;
4. The need for the creation, within the sphere of the PPDDH, of a mechanism that articulates responsibilities of various state bodies to confront the structural causes behind violations and the contexts in which the defenders are working;
5. The need to implement a working plan, in conjunction with justice and public safety institutions, focused on supporting and monitoring court cases and police inquiries that involve defenders. The plan should cover at a minimum, investigations of violence or threats, and guarantees of legal assistance in cases involving the criminalization of their struggle in defense of human rights;
6. The need to expand partnerships with the federal states and reduce the bureaucracy in order to move beyond agreements and towards new ways of implementing protection policies;
7. The need to improve the methodology of protection, in order to serve those groups and communities that fight for defenders, especially traditional peoples and communities;
8. The need for articulation of social policies that provide for the social protection of the defenders of human rights included in the Program, including medical, psychological and welfare assistance, for example;
9. The need for the creation and training of specialized police units for the protection of human rights defenders, as well as specialized organs and procedures designed to receive and process accusations made by human rights defenders;
10. The urgent need for the creation of a specific PPDDH mechanism to meet the requirements of the federal states of Amazonia and Mato Grosso do Sul, involving national and regional organs;
11. The need to create a specific methodology to work with defenders of human rights, incorporating the gender perspective;
12. The need to construct a specific methodology to serve communicators in such a way as to understand the specifics of the violations that occur within the context of violations of the right to freedom of expression.
A PROTECTION PROGRAM FOR COMMUNICATORS?

It should be stressed, however, that these deficiencies and failings have been brought to the attention of the PPDDH when providing for the needs of HRDs in general. The fact is that, when we speak of communicators, the deficiencies and failings are even greater.

Even though the Brazilian Government has already publicly stated that the PPDDH should also serve communicators, in its current form the PPDDH is incapable of meeting these demands. There are no specific methodologies for providing services and protection, nor is there any form of appropriate dissemination to this group, even from the team working at the federal level. Neither is there participation from communication entities, and CSOs and groups that, according to the original model should be actively participating in the program.

One significant issue concerns the inclusion of communicators in the PPDDH. This constituency are mostly unaware of the program, and do not see themselves as a group that could be assisted by the policy.

Another fundamental issue in the provision of this service to communicators concerns the methodologies of inclusion which, in this case, can be differentiated from the methodologies involving defenders of human rights in general. Many communicators work through digital mediums and are persecuted precisely for the use of this form of communication due to the reach it has. Others work in investigative journalism and need to place themselves in situations of risk or work anonymously in order to investigate a particular fact of interest to society as a whole.

HRDs also use communication strategies to defend the rights they pursue, often suffering violence on two fronts. As such, understanding the specifics and demands of this particular group in order to construct a methodology of protection that can be applied to them, is a central requirement for the protection policy.

Finally, we should give priority to the issue concerning the participation of freedom of expression organizations and entities representing the professional communication sector. As demonstrated in the Mexican and Colombian mechanisms, these organizations are essential for the protection mechanisms to develop real conditions to meet the needs of the communicators. Organizations that work in this area collect information on the types of violations suffered by communicators and the contexts in which they generally take place. Most importantly, they are in direct contact with the communicators, and through this dynamic relationships public policy is made more effective, and greater numbers of communicators access the mechanism when faced with risks and threats.

COMPARISON - PROTECTION MECHANISMS

**LEGAL FRAMEWORK**

- MEXICO
- COLOMBIA
- BRAZIL

**SPECIFIC METHODOLOGIES FOR RISK ASSESSMENT**

- MEXICO
- COLOMBIA
- BRAZIL

**SPECIFIC PROTECTION MEASURES FOR COMMUNICATORS**

- MEXICO
- COLOMBIA
- BRAZIL

**PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS SPECIALIZED IN THE ISSUE**

- MEXICO
- COLOMBIA
- BRAZIL

**PARTICIPATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

- MEXICO
- COLOMBIA
- BRAZIL
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the specific political contexts of Brazil, Mexico and Colombia a clear similarity exists in the situations faced by the communicators at risk in these countries. People who challenge the established powers in order to relate facts that are of public interest, draw attention to irregularities and even fight for other rights through the exercising freedom of expression. While Mexico and Colombia have taken important steps in the preservation of the right to freedom of expression similar steps need to be taken by the Brazilian State. The very creation of protection mechanisms dedicated to communicators demonstrates this.

Despite important advances, it is also necessary to stress the lack of political will to improve protection policies and to make them more effective. Indeed this is a common feature amongst the Latin-American States that have developed such mechanisms. Because operational challenges exist and are common to them all, these public policies act more as a form of palliative measure rather than being truly capable of resolving the threats and violations against HRDs and communicators.

Even so, civil society organizations that monitor these matters in general agree that a mechanism of this nature is fundamental for the State to recognize the violence that hovers over communicators and HRDs, as well as for the State to assume its responsibility in providing protection.

We have seen that awareness and debate in Brazil around this critical situation for communicators has found its way into many spheres of government, and human rights organizations, and into society as a whole. However, for this issue to move out of the “debating room” and into priorities requiring implementation by the State, involves taking a bold step towards strengthening democracy itself. To do so is vital to health of civil society in Brazil.

The government of Brazil must take urgent measures on protection and prevention of violations against communicators. Regardless of the format in which a future mechanism is constructed, be it through the creation of a specific program or the incorporation of the communicators into the existing mechanism, it is necessary that the protection policies reach those at risk by establishing methods of risk evaluation and suitable protection measures. Most of all it is essential that the communicators themselves, along with the CSOs participate in the creation and continuation of a protection mechanism.

Despite its numerous limitations the Brazilian State should strengthen the PPDDH to better protect communicators. To this end we recommend to the executive and legislative powers of the Brazilian State, the following:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Swift progress and approval of Bill nr. 4,575 (dated 2009), transferring the Brazilian protection program (PPDDH) into law, as well as the establishment of specific resource allocations to state programs;

2. Repeal of Decree nr. 8724/2016 which altered the structure of the PPDDH, thereby removing the participation of civil society in its decision-making Council;

3. Greater dissemination of the PPDDH specifically to communicators;

4. Revision of the protection methodologies contained in the PPDDH, as well as those of Federal and State teams, considering the specifics of the communicators;

5. Effective participation of the communicators in the construction and revision of the methodologies that already exist in the PPDDH, with a focus on the protection of communicators;
ARTICLE 19 defines the violation of the right to freedom of expression as any action from governmental or non-governmental players that directly or indirectly interferes in the free flow of ideas, opinions or information. The State’s omission regarding these actions is also considered a violation of freedom of expression.

According to Article 19 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), freedom of expression is the right that everyone has to “hold their own opinion without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”

To generate the data, the first step is to monitor the cases, by searching violations daily in the media throughout the country and mapping them, as well as contacting communicators and local organizations.

To generate the data, the first step is to monitor the cases, by searching violations daily in the media throughout the country and mapping them, as well as contacting communicators and local organizations.

After the data gathering stage, a more thorough investigation of the violations considered to be serious is carried out, by contacting the victim or their family, workmates, unions or representative associations and the local authorities responsible for following up on the case. After these different players are interviewed, if it is clear that there is a causal relationship between the exercise of freedom of expression and the violation suffered by the victim, said violation is included in the report.

Therefore, it is possible that cases with significant exposure in the media are not included in the report, if the causal relationship was not clearly established in the interviews.
**APPENDIX**

**LIST OF COMMUNICATORS VICTIMS OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS IN 2016**

### HOMICIDES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VICTIM</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CITY / STATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>João Miranda do Carmo</td>
<td>07/24/2016</td>
<td>Santo Antônio do Descoberto / GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurício Campos Rosa</td>
<td>08/17/2016</td>
<td>Santa Luzia / MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luciano Fernandes</td>
<td>10/25/2016</td>
<td>Piripiri / PI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Etna Duval</td>
<td>12/27/2016</td>
<td>Abel Figueiredo / PA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ATTEMPTED MURDERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VICTIM</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CITY / STATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renato Pitanga</td>
<td>02/19/2016</td>
<td>Caruarai / AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jair Pereira Teixeira</td>
<td>03/27/2016</td>
<td>Forquilha / CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alisson de Mello Schneider</td>
<td>08/19/2016</td>
<td>Colombo / PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaldo de Oliveira</td>
<td>09/26/2016</td>
<td>Franco da Rocha / SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luiz Valério</td>
<td>12/12/2016</td>
<td>Boa Vista / RR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DEATH THREATS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VICTIM</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CITY / STATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Leite Xavier</td>
<td>01/25/2016</td>
<td>Assaré / CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jucelino Dantas</td>
<td>01/26/2016</td>
<td>Acopiara / CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Pereira de Souza</td>
<td>03/07/2016</td>
<td>Ribeirão Pires / SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandre Bezerra</td>
<td>03/22/2016</td>
<td>Betim / MG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euclides Gonçalves de Oliveira</td>
<td>03/31/2016</td>
<td>Niquelândia / GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonas Santos</td>
<td>04/14/2016</td>
<td>Parintins / AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindenberg Tavares</td>
<td>04/19/2016</td>
<td>Sumé / PB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex da Silva Carlos</td>
<td>04/20/2016</td>
<td>Igarapé do Meio / MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henrique Beirangê</td>
<td>04/25/2016</td>
<td>São Paulo / SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Barroso</td>
<td>05/12/2016</td>
<td>Esperantinópolis / MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delcide Alves Ribeiro</td>
<td>05/31/2016</td>
<td>Londrina / PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noerivan do Nascimento Pereira</td>
<td>08/05/2016</td>
<td>Poções / BA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caíque Marquez</td>
<td>08/19/2016</td>
<td>Gramado / BA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Alexandrino da Cunha</td>
<td>08/20/2016</td>
<td>Chapadinha / MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Gooldemberg de Sousa</td>
<td>09/05/2016</td>
<td>Quixadá / CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paulo Cezar de Andrade Prado</td>
<td>09/09/2016</td>
<td>São Paulo / SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luiz Jose Ferreira de Brito</td>
<td>09/19/2016</td>
<td>Jeremoabo / BA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adelson Meira</td>
<td>09/26/2016</td>
<td>Poções / BA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlos Eduardo Henriqueita</td>
<td>09/2016</td>
<td>Franco da Rocha / SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Saraiva</td>
<td>10/02/2016</td>
<td>José de Freitas / PI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Bastos</td>
<td>11/22/2016</td>
<td>Coelho Neto / MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wesley Silas da Cruz</td>
<td>11/30/2016</td>
<td>Gurupi / TO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES

1 Communicators are defined as those working in and through the media as journalists, bloggers, radio broadcasters and photographers.

2 A more detailed analysis of the relationship between political coverage and violations of freedom of expression can be found in the ‘Violations of Freedom of Expression’ report from 2014. The report, in Portuguese, can be found on the violacoes.artigo19.org portal.

3 In order to investigate this information, the team from ARTICLE 19 contacted both the victims and the authorities responsible for the cases (by telephone and official letter sent to the police stations). In many cases, the authorities not only refused to give any information about the progress of the investigations and the lines of investigation that had been considered, but also did not state whether an investigation was even under way.


10 http://flip.org.co/sites/default/files/archivos_publicacion/5%20a%C3%B1os%20protecci%C3%B3n%20mocitos%20y%20defensores%20de%20d%20periodistas%20en%20Colombia.pdf


12 Decree nr. 6044


14 PL457/2009

15 Decree nr. 6724/2016


17 As above


19 Examples of some of the letters sent by the DDH committee with recommendations to the Brazilian State can be found at the following links (in portuguese):


21 Data provided by the PPDDH at a meeting of the CNDH Protection Programs Sub-commission held in January 2017.
“This report is wholly or partially financed by the Swedish International Development Cooperation, Sida. Sida does not necessarily share the opinions here within expressed. The author bears the sole responsibility for the content.”